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Abstrat
We ontinue the analysis of quantum-like desription of markets
and eonomis. The approah has roots in the reently developed
quantum game theory and quantum omputing. The present paper
is devoted to quantum bargaining games whih are a speial lass of
quantum market games without institutionalized learinghouses.
PACS numbers: 02.50.Le, 03.67.-a, 03.65.Bz
1 Quantum bargaining
There have reently been important hanges in the paradigms of eonomis:
eonomists disuss the role of the Heisenberg unertainty relation [1℄ or even
dare laim that quantum mehanis and mathematial eonomis are isomor-
phi [2℄. These shoking hanges have probably been brought about by the
emergene of eonophysis. Researh on quantum omputation and quantum
information allows to extend the sope game theory for the quantum world
[3, 4℄. Among various proposed qualitative sienti methods only quantum
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theory does not allow to take no aount of the news phenomenon so persis-
tent in soial sienes [22℄. Therefore the quantum-like desription of market
phenomena has a remarkable hane of gaining favourable reeption from
the experts. On the other hand only thorough investigation may reveal if
eonomis already is in or would ever enter the domain of quantum theory.
The present authors have given a general desription of quantum market
games (q-games) in a reent paper, [5℄. Among them one may distinguish
the lass of quantum transations (q-transations) that is q-games without
institutionalized learinghouses. This lass omprises quantum bargaining
(q-bargaining) whih are disussed in the present paper and quantum au-
tion (q-aution) to be disussed in a separate paper. The partiipants of a
q-bargaining game will be alled Alie (A) and Bob (B). We will suppose
that they settle beforehand who is the buyer (Alie) and who is the seller
(Bob). A two-way q-bargaining that is a q-bargaining when the last ondi-
tion is not fullled, will be analyzed in a separate paper. Alie enter into
negotiations with Bob to settle the prie for the transation. Therefore the
proper measuring apparatus onsists of the pair of traders in question. In
q-aution the measuring apparatus onsists of a one side only, the initiator
of the aution.
2 The Riemann sphere of polarization states
We will identify the spae of Alie polarization states with the one dimen-
sional omplex projetive spae CP 1. Points in CP 1 will be alled polariza-
tions (or q-bits [6℄). We will use the projetive oordinates ξ = (ξ0, ξ1). In
fat, we will introdue a two dimensional Hilbert spae Hs and hoose an
orthonormal basis (|〉, |〉), |ξ〉 = ξ0|〉 + ξ1|〉 ∈ Hs . The salar produt of
two vetors |ξ′〉, |ξ′′〉 ∈ Hs is given by
〈ξ′|ξ′′〉 = ξ¯′0ξ
′′
0 + ξ¯
′
1ξ
′′
1 = ξ¯ · ξ . (1)
where ξ¯k, k = 0, 1 denotes the omplex onjugate of do ξk. The proportional
vetors |ξ〉 and t|ξ〉 (t ∈ C \ {0}) will be identied. If we perform the
transition from the homogeneous oordinates to the non-homogeneous ones,
ξ = (ξ0, ξ1)→ (1, z =
ξ1
ξ0
), (0, ξ1)→∞, then the projetive spae CP
1
may be
identied with the ompatied Gauss plain C. A point z ∈ Cmay in turn be
identied with a point in the two dimensional sphere S2. This identiation
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is given by the bijetion Hs→S
2
S2 ∋ (x1, x2, x3) =: −→r (ξ) =
〈ξ|−→σ ξ〉
〈ξ|ξ〉
, (2)
where
−→σ := (σ1, σ2, σ3) and σ1, σ2 and σ3 are the Pauli matries. The
mapping (2) is alled Cayley-Klein parameterisation. We will use all the three
equivalent desriptions CP 1 ≃ C ≃ S2 of the spae of polarization states
but one must remember that the superposition (addition) of polarization
states may only be performed in the Hilbert spae Hs [6℄. The probability
of measuring the strategy |ξ′′〉 in the state strategy |ξ′〉 is given by squared
module of the salar produt (1) of the states and may be expressed in terms
of the angle α between the orresponding unit vetors −→r (ξ′),−→r (ξ′′) ∈ R3
(that is in S2) by the formula
|〈ξ′|ξ′′〉|2
〈ξ′|ξ′〉〈ξ′′|ξ′′〉
=
1 +−→r (ξ′) · −→r (ξ′′)
2
= cos2
α
2
.
Points in the Riemann sphere, z ∈ C, are in the following 1-1 orrespondene
with projetive operators P−→r ating on the Hilbert spae Hs :
P−→r (ξ)|ξ
′〉 :=
〈ξ|ξ′〉
〈ξ|ξ〉
|ξ〉.
They are usually written as P−→r (ξ) =
|ξ〉〈ξ|
〈ξ|ξ〉
. In the orthonormal basis (|〉, |〉)
the projetors take the matrix form P−→r :
P−→r =
I +−→r · −→σ
2
, (3)
where I is the unit matrix. This representation is referred to as the Stokes
parametrization [7℄ and is the inverse one to the Cayley-Kleina parametriza-
tion (2). We will use the following interpretation of the Alie polarization
state |ξ〉A ∈ HsA (that is of her strategy). If she formulates the onditions
of the transation we say she has the polarization  (and is in the state
|−→r 〉A = |〉). In q-bargaining this means that she put forward the prie.
In the opposite ase, when she deides if the transation is made or not,
we say she has the polarization |〉. (She aepts or not the onditions of
the proposed transation.) This is an analogy of the isospin symmetry in
nulear physis whih says that nuleon has two polarization states: proton
and neutron. The vetors (|〉, |〉) form an orthonormal basis in Hs , the
linear hull of possible Alie polarization states. Bob's polarization is dened
in an analogous way.
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3 Polarizations of q-bargaining
The states representing Alie and Bob strategies are fermions from the physi-
al point of view. This seemingly surprising statement onsist in notiing that
the transation in question is made only if the traders have opposite polariza-
tions (and even that is not a guarantee of the aomplishment). Obviously,
the states of Alie and Bob beame entangled if they enter into q-bargaining.
The redution of the state |ξ〉A (Alie) to |〉A or |〉A always results in Bob
winding up in in the state |〉B or |〉B, respetively. Therefore the spae
of polarizations of q-bargaining is isomorphi to the spae of polarizations
of a single partiipant of the bargaining in question (CP 1). The homoge-
neous oordinates of polarizations of q-bargaining, that is a two dimensional
omplex Hilbert spae Hs ⊂ HsA
⊗
HsB, is spanned by two orthonormal
vetors |〉 := |〉A|〉B and |〉 := |〉A|〉B. A market proess resulting
in q-bargaining is desribed by a projetion P|〉 : HsA
⊗
HsB → Hs . The
result of the projetion depends on the hoie of the basis (|〉, |〉) (it is
suient to point out the vetor |〉). We will suppose that the polarization
of q-bargaining is determined by the pair of partiipants in a unique way.
This polarization spae has a fasinating onnetion to Lorentzian ge-
ometry (speial relativity). We annot help noting here that, aording to
Penrose [20, 21℄, CP 1 ≃ S2 may be identied with the heavenly sphere of
light rays oming to an observer. The group of onformal transformations of
the Riemannn sphere PSL(2,C) is isomorphi to the proper Lorentz group
SO0(3, 1) that preserves the Minkowski metri. Penrose have also shown
that the points on the heavenly sphere may be obtained from spinors so that
any point on the heavenly sphere orresponds to a proposition speifying the
state of a spinor ( in the spae of propositions in the quantum logi assoi-
ated to the Jordan algebra h2(C)).
The arguments given in the following paragraph show that the state |〉
is more protable for Alie than the state |〉. The skill of repliation of
the vetor |〉 would allow Alie avoiding winding up in the state |〉. But
quantum loning is not possible [8℄ and this makes the quantum bargain-
ing nontrivial and very interesting. It seems worth to notie that although
the polarization state annot be loned it may be transferred. We may by
using lassial and quantum ommuniation hannels [9, 10℄ teleport Alie
polarization state to another q-bargaining site. In that way Alie may enter
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into negotiation with Bill instead of Bob. Nevertheless, she will not be able
to aomplish both transation simultaneously. This seems to be natural if
one realls the ommon belief in undividity of attention. Alie however may
multiply her prots during a xed interval by using nanial osillators [11℄.
To this end she must be able to master validity times of various nanial
instruments bought or sold in q-bargaining at dierent times.
We will say that Alie polarization |ξ〉A dominates Bob' one |ξ〉B ( |ξ〉A
≻
|ξ〉B) during q-bargaining with the polarization |〉 if the probability of being
in the state |〉 is greater for Alie than for Bob, that is
|ξ〉A
≻ |ξ〉B ⇔
|〈|ξ〉A|

A〈ξ|ξ〉A
>
|〈|ξ〉B|

B〈ξ|ξ〉B
⇔ x3A < x3B.
This denition is justied by the asymmetry of prots made on a deal by the
same party having dierent polarizations |〉 and |〉. More detailed analysis
of possible prots will be presented in the following paragraph. Of ourse, if
the polarizations are the same then the relation of dominane is transitive.
If we onsider three parties A, B and C and every pair of them enters into a
q-bargaining then we have(
|ξ〉A
≻ |ξ〉B and |ξ〉B
≻ |ξ〉C
)
⇒ |ξ〉A
≻ |ξ〉C.
In this ase there is a statistial non-quantum model [7℄ leading to results
idential to those of the disussed here q-bargaining. However, if the polar-
izations are not onstrained by ultural ustoms or initial agreement they
usually are dierent and it is possible that
|ξ〉A
≻ |ξ〉B , |ξ〉B
̂≻ |ξ〉C and |ξ〉C
̂̂≻ |ξ〉A
An extreme example is the situation when |ξ〉A ∼ |〉, |ξ〉B ∼ |̂〉 and |ξ〉C ∼
|̂̂〉 already known from the popular game rok, paper and sissors (RPS).
If domination results in prot asymmetry among partiipants (see below)
then traders buying or selling, say, shares issued by ompanies belonging
to Alie, Bob and Carol may be pereived as if playing an RPS game. A
quantum version of the RPS game is disussed by Iqbal and Tool [12℄. They
showed that ontrary to the lassial ase there is a stable Nash equilibrium
in the quantum RPS game. The observed non-transitivity of dominane in
bargaining is a ase in point for using quantum desription of bargaining.
5
Empirial veriation should deide if suh approah is orret. Of ourse,
one may tray to realize q-bargaining games on quantum level where both
parties may be formed by oalitions and the appropriate states would be
superpositions of states of the members but this is beyond the sope of the
present analysis.
4 Rationality of deisions of making bargain
Let us reall that the Alie strategy is, besides its polarization |ξ〉A ∈HsA,
given by the supply-demand fator |ψ〉A ∈ HA [5℄. The total state of q-
bargaining, |Ψ〉 = |ξ〉|ψ〉A|ψ〉B, belongs to the tensor produt of Hilbert
spaes Hs
⊗
HA
⊗
HB. Let us onsider the following situation. Alie is
going to buy some ommodity at the prie c. The random variable q := − ln c
desribes the possible prot if the transation would ome true. To be more
preise, the additive logarithmi return ratio ln c0
c
= ln c0 − ln c measures
prots made by Alie if the ommodity bought at the prie c has a real value
c0 to her. If on the other side Bob want to sell the ommodity at the prie c
his potential prots desribes the random variable p := ln c. Note that that
the supply of an asset at the prie c may be pereived as demand of money
for whih one pays a denite amount of the asset equal to c−1. Therefore
there is no minus sign in the denition of the random variable p. The axioms
of quantum theory say that the probability density of revealing Alie and
Bob intentions desribed by the random variables q and p, respetively, is
given by
|〈q|ψ〉A|
2
A〈ψ|ψ〉A
|〈p|ψ〉B|
2
B〈ψ|ψ〉B
dqdp , (4)
where 〈q|ψ〉A is the probability amplitude of oering the prie q by Alie
who wants to buy and the demand omponent of her state is given by |ψ〉A ∈
HA. Bob's amplitude 〈p|ψ〉B is interpreted in an analogous way. Of ourse,
the "intentions" q and p not always result in the aomplishment of the
transation. If Alie being in the polarization state |〉 oers q that is the
prie c = e−q then Bob aepts it only if p ≤ −q (ep 6 e−q). The symmetry
(q, p, c)→ (p, q, c−1) ditates the aeptability ondition for Alie in the state
|〉. The transation would be aomplished only if Alie pays no more than
she plans, p ≤ −q. Therefore the rationality of the deision does not depend
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on polarization and is desribed by the ondition
q + p ≤ 0 . (5)
If we hange the onvention so that the variable q desribes prots of the
trading with Alie party instead of hers then the ondition (5) takes the form
q + p ≥ 0 with aordingly hanged interpretation of p.
Let us use the onvenient Iverson notation [14℄ in whih [expression]
denotes the logial value (1 or 0) of the sentene expression. The logarithm
of the transation prie, ln c is the random variable −q or p depending on
the polarization of the transation (|〉 or |〉, respetively) restrited by
the ondition (5). Therefore to obtain the probability density in the state
|〉 we have to integrate over p the density given by Eq. (4) multiplied by
[q + p ≤ 0] (Iverson notation)
∫∞
−∞
[q + p ≤ 0] |〈p|ψ〉B|
2
B〈ψ|ψ〉B
dp
|〈q|ψ〉A|
2
A〈ψ|ψ〉A
dq
∣∣∣
q=− ln c
= (6)∫ ln c
−∞
|〈p|ψ〉B|
2
B〈ψ|ψ〉B
dp
|〈− ln c|ψ〉A|
2
A〈ψ|ψ〉A
d ln c (7)
In an analogous way one gets the distribution of the random variable ln c for
the polarization |〉
∫∞
−∞
[q + p ≤ 0] |〈q|ψ〉A|
2
A〈ψ|ψ〉A
dq
|〈p|ψ〉B|
2
B〈ψ|ψ〉B
dp
∣∣∣
p=ln c
= (8)∫ − ln c
−∞
|〈q|ψ〉A|
2
A〈ψ|ψ〉A
dq
|〈ln c|ψ〉B |
2
B〈ψ|ψ〉B
d ln c (9)
Note that these distribution are not yet orretly normalized.
5 The ase when Alie bargains with the Rest
of the World
Let us now onsider the possible inuene of hanges in the prie harater
of strategies of bargaining parties on their prots. The analysis of Nash equi-
librium states [15℄ of partiipants hanging their polarizations via strategies
being unitary homographies on CP 1A i CP
1
B will be presented in a separate
work. To illustrate the ourse of q-bargaining and the resulting prots let
us onsider a simple model. Suppose that Alie state is given by a wave
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funtion being a proper funtion of the demand operator [5℄. Then the prob-
ability density
|〈q|ψ〉A|
2
A〈ψ|ψ〉A
, see Eq. (7) and (9) is given by Dira delta funtion
δ(q−a). We interpret it as the strategy I buy only if the prie c lower than
e−a (therefore we all the value e−a the withdrawal prie). Let now Carol
represent the Rest of the World (RW ) strategy [5℄ that is a market on whih
the good Alie is going to buy fullls the demand-supply law (is not a gien
[5℄). Then, aording to the theorem disussed in Ref. [5℄, the probability
density
|〈p|ψ〉RW |
2
RW〈ψ|ψ〉RW
is normal (gaussian). Choosing appropriate units of the
good in question and performing the sale transformation p→ σp, where σ is
the dispersion leads to the standard normal distribution η(p). The formulas
(7) i (9) take the following form:∫ ln c
−∞
η(p) dp δ(ln c+ a) d ln c (10)
and
[ln c+ a ≤ 0] η(ln c) d ln c . (11)
The integrals of (10) and (11) over ln c ∈ (−∞,∞) represent the probability
of making q-transation E([ln c + a ≤ 0]) (equal for both polarizations |〉
and |〉). The time of waiting for aomplishment of the transation τ is a
random variable with a geometrial distribution [13℄ and does not depend on
polarization. Its expetation value is equal to
E(τ) =
(
1 + E([ln c+ a ≤ 0])
∞∑
k=1
k (1−E([ln c+ a ≤ 0]))k−1
)
θ (12)
=
(
1 + (E([ln c+ a ≤ 0]))−1
)
θ , (13)
where θ is the harateristi (mean) time of duration of q-bargaining [13℄.
Eq. (12) respets the time Alie needs for selling the good (also equal to θ).
This is a onsequene of her strategy δ(q − a). The prot Alie made in a
sequene idential of q-bargaining is measured by the prot intensity equal
to [15℄
−
pE(ln c) + (1− p)E(ln c)
E(τ)
, (14)
where p := |〈|〉|

is the probability of making the transation with po-
larization |〉. The distributions (10) and (11) are not normalized so the av-
eraging E() and E() should be performed with appropriately normalized
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distributions (10) i (11), that is δ(ln c + a)d ln c and [ln c+a≤0]
E([ln c+a≤0])
η(ln c)d ln c.
By ombing Eq. (14) and Eq. (12) and multiplying both the numerator and
denominator by E([ln c + a ≤ 0]) we get the following funtion ρ(a) giving
the Alie prot intensity (in units of θ)
ρ(a) =
∫ −a
−∞
(
pa− px
)
η(x)dx
1 +
∫ −a
−∞
η(x)dx
(15)
-2
0
2
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
-1.5
-1
-0.5
0
Figure 1: Alie prot intensity in q-bargaining with RW as a funtion of log-
arithm of withdrawal prie a ∈ [−2.5, 2.5] and probability p of q-bargaining
being in the state |〉.
In the ase when Rest of the World always deides to make the transa-
tion (p10 = 1) the maximal prot intensity Alie may get is equal 0.14028 and
orresponds to the withdrawal prie a equal to 0.85096. If on the other hand
Rest of the World always proposes the prie then Alie get the maximal prot
intensity for the strategy a = 0.27063. This value has the property of being
a xed point of the funtion ρ(a) (ρ is a ontration almost everywhere) [13℄.
Therefore if Alie does not know the parameters of the RW distribution her
best method of ahieving the ondition a = 0.27063σ in a polarization state
|〉 is the simple iteration ρ(a)→ a leading to self-orreting optimal algo-
rithm for getting the withdrawal prie a. In the disussed q-bargaining the
polarization |〉 is more protable for Alie than |〉. The harateristis of
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q-bargaining are presented in Fig. 1 (diagram of the funtion ρ = ρ(a, p)).
If p = 1 then any value of a brings non-zero average prots. On the other
hand, if the q-bargaining has the polarization |〉 (that is p = 0) any strat-
egy with a < 0 results in loses. Therefore we should not be surprised that
rivalry among sellers resulted in a market where sellers display pries to give
their potential lients better bargaining positions.
6 Temperatures of mixtures of q-bargaining
General quantum bargaining involves mixed strategies and therefore should
be desribed in terms of probability density matrix (operator) ρ dened
on the Hilbert spae Hs
⊗
HA
⊗
HB. Cases when the polarization of q-
bargaining does not depend on mutually independent mixed strategies of
Alie and Bob should be desribed by fatorized density operators of the
form ρ = ρsρAρB, where ρs is dened in Hs , ρA in HA, and ρB in HB. The
polarization state of q-bargaining,ρs, is now a onvex linear ombination of
pure states P−→r belonging to S
2
given by
ρβs ,−→r =
e
βs
2
−→r ·−→σ
Tr(e
βs
2
−→r ·−→σ )
=
1
2
(
I +−→r · −→σ tanh
βs
2
)
, (16)
where Tr denotes trae and βs ∈ R is the inverse of spin temperature of
the system desribed by the density operator ρβs ,−→r . The above formula may
be simplied by substitution
βs
2
→ βs but our onvention leads to formulas
onsistent with those performed in the two-dimensional representation of the
Lie algebra su(2). It follows from Eq. (16) that the limits of ρ are projetions
lim
βs→∞
ρβs ,−→r = lim
βs→−∞
ρβs ,−−→r = P−→r .
Let us suppose that βs ≥ 0 in order to get unamibiguous parameterization of
the unit ball K2 (apart from the enter). We may identify every polarization
state ρβs ,−→r with some point ρ ∈ K2 . Strait lines joining those points with
the enter ut the sphere S2 at two antipodal points −−→r and −→r . The
proportion of the division of the segment {−−→r ,−→r } by ρ determines for every
polarization state oeients of its representation as a onvex ombination
of two projetions
ρβs ,−→r =
P−→r
1 + e−βs
+
P−−→r
1 + eβs
.
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This onstrution may be performed even if β=0 when ρ is the enter of K2
but then the diretion of
−→r is undetermined. There is another important
quantity, namely Shannon entropy S, that, instead of spin temperature, may
be used to parameterize polarization states. In our ase Shannon entropy is
given by
S(βs) = −Tr(ρβs ,−→r ln ρβs ,−→r ) =
ln
(
1 + eβs
)
1 + eβs
+
ln
(
1 + e−βs
)
1 + e−βs
.
The present authors introdued in Ref. [13℄ risk temperature, being the
inverse of Legendre multiplier β . There is the following relation between the
dispersion σ and the risk temperature β−1 of the disussed above demand-
supply part of strategy of the Rest of the World (normal distribution)
σ2 tanh
hEβ
2 θ
= const.
Here hE is the eonomi analogue of Plank onstant. In q-bargaining the
temperature of Alie strategy is zero beause her strategy may be pereived
as the limit of the normal distribution with dispersion tending to zero. This
allows her to perform arbitrage. The only remedy for limiting Alie prots
in trading with the Rest of the World onsists in the lowering of the RW
dispersion σ, that is the risk temperature β−1. As a result the optimal value
of the parameter a of Alie strategy will be shifted towards zero. Alie, to
orret her strategy, have to start a new iterative proedure to nd the new
optimal value of a and this will enlarge dispersion of her strategy (β−1Alice > 0).
This proess resembles heat transfer from a hot thermostat (RW ) to a old
one (Alie). As a result the thermostat RW ools down. Alie gets warmer
and subsequently while nding new value of a lowers her temperature (and
entropy).
If we introdue a mehanism of oupling polarization of RW with its
demand-supply part η(p) being an integralWigner funtion with Gibbs weights
[5℄, we would get a model analogous to spin system interating with phonon
thermostat [16℄. We envisage the investigation of q-bargaining with meth-
ods harateristi to quantum quasi-equilibrium stohasti proesses. This
should result in formulation of nonlinear equations governing the dynamis
of hanges in risk and spin temperatures. But investigation of q-bargaining
without the underlying thermostat RW that ditates market pries seems to
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be to abstrat for appliation in eonomis. It is ustomary that the polar-
ization state in bargaining with the Rest of the World is xed in advane
(e.g. sellers prie). Therefore nontrivial desription of hanges in spin tem-
perature of q-bargaining may be obtained only in models with at least three
parties: A, B and RW with A and B using dierent strategies with respet
to themselves than to RW . Suh a minimal model is four-dimensional and
desribes risk temperatures of A, B and RW and spin temperature of the
q-bargaining between A and B.
Note that spin temperature resembles another Legendre multiplier on-
neted to portfolio managing and introdued and disussed in Ref. [17℄. Suh
oupled to the logarithmi rate of return portfolio temperature (third kind of
temperature of eonomi proess!) allows to ompare skills of investors ative
in dierent market or market onditions and not neessary during the same
intervals. For an aggressive market ativity the logarithmi rate of return
ease to be additive and portfolio temperatures aquire nonzero imaginary
parts [11℄. The onsidered above q-bargaining between Alie and RW with
both polarizations may be pereived as multiple buying and selling of some
nanial asset with normal distribution of quotation of logarithm of its prie.
So we are able to determine the portfolio temperature of Alie strategy. Suh
thermodynamis of q-bargaining between Alie and RW would be presented
elsewhere.
7 Final remarks
If Bill intervene in q-bargaining between Alie and Bob so that rst trans-
ation is made between Alie and Bill and the seond between Bob and Bill
then we may all the proess omplex q-bargaining between Alie and Bob.
The middlemen (e.g. Bill) are lters from the quantum mehanial point of
view. In omplex q-bargaining one may give up learing of the intermediate
transations. This would result in superposition of amplitudes haraterizing
prots (logarithm of pries) and polarizations of omplex q-bargaining.
The disussed onnetion between q-bargaining and ondensed matter
physis suggest that q-bargaining might be performed with help of quantum
automata. If Penrose is right in his suggestions onerning the proess of
thinking [18℄ the phenomen of q-bargaining might be possible to detet in
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present markets where transations are made due to non-omputational al-
gorithms. Does a middleman performs the role of a "polarizator" failitating
making transations?
If we onsider more realisti market of several assets then q-bargaining
will onern many prie-like parameters c1, c2, . . . . So q-bargaining may be
used for modeling negotiations based on multi-riterion valuation of the oer.
Anient Greeks, already 800 years BC, knew that the polarization |〉
is more protable for Alie, that is she aepts the transation instead of
proposing the prie. Heziod writes [19℄ that Zeus aepting the method one
divides the other hooses in his deal with Prometheus , let the human to
divide.
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